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Taming North Korea
Joseph S Nye is Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and author, most recently, of The Power Game: A Washington Novel. His previous post on Webdiary was The Fragility of a Flat World.
by Joseph S Nye
The fires of the Middle East must not be allowed to distract the world’s attention from the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, which it demonstrated by its recent test of a long-range missile. Yet that is what appears to be happening.
In mid-July, the Group of Eight’s summit in St. Petersburg ended by calling on North Korea to stop its missile tests and to abandon its nuclear weapons program. This followed a UN Security Council resolution that condemned North Korea’s missile launches of July 5, demanded that it return to the negotiating table, and required UN members to prevent the import and export of any material or money related to North Korea’s missile or unconventional weapons programs. China’s President Hu Jintao urged progress in the stalled talks so that "the entire Korean peninsula can be denuclearized." This seemed like a diplomatic breakthrough, but there was less forward movement than meets the eye.
During its first term, the Bush administration hoped that it could solve the North Korean nuclear problem through regime change. The hope was that isolation and sanctions would topple Kim Jong Il’s dictatorship. But the regime proved resistant, and the Bush administration agreed to enter into six-party talks with China, Russia, Japan, and the two Koreas.
In September 2005, it appeared momentarily that the talks had produced a rough agreement that North Korea would forgo its nuclear program in return for security guarantees and removal of sanctions. But the loosely worded accord soon collapsed, and North Korea refused to return to the talks until the US stopped shutting down bank accounts suspected of counterfeiting and laundering money for Kim’s regime. Diplomacy remained stalled until North Korea launched a series of missiles into the Sea of Japan in July. Japan called for UN Security Council sanctions, and after ten days of wrangling, all five permanent members agreed on a resolution condemning North Korea’s actions.
Why did North Korea risk taking actions that defied China, its main benefactor, and brought about the UN resolution? In part, it acted because it saw the great powers offering Iran an interesting package of incentives to give up its nuclear enrichment program, while North Korea was being relegated to a diplomatic side track. But it also acted because taking such risks has proven successful in the past, and here, Kim probably believed the risks were low.
Kim knows that the five other countries in the six-party talks are divided. While all five want a non-nuclear North Korea, China and South Korea place a higher priority on the stability of the North Korean regime than the US and Japan do.
South Korean public opinion is split on how to handle the North, but the majority fear that a sudden collapse would have catastrophic effects on the South’s economy. Many in the younger generation have no direct memories of the Korean War. Thus, South Korea’s "sunshine policy" of economic engagement with the North commands majority approval.
Similarly, China, with its focus on economic growth, fears that a collapse of the North Korean regime would threaten stability on its borders. Thus, while China has occasionally pressed North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, it has been unwilling to exercise its economic leverage to a point that threatens the regime.
Because its preferred approach of regime change has proven slower than expected, and because time plays into Kim’s hands, the Bush administration faces three other options in attempting to deal with North Korea’s nuclear weapons. It could use force, and some officials have argued that if North Korea launched a war in response to a limited American air strike, Kim would lose his regime. Thus, war would be unlikely.
But is unlikely that an air strike would destroy North Korea’s hidden facilities, which include more than 10,000 artillery tubes buried in caves along the demilitarized zone, North Korea could simply shell Seoul in response and wreak havoc on the South Korean economy. Thus, South Korea, together with China, would likely react strongly against an American air strike.
A second option is sanctions. Some in the Bush administration believe that even if economic sanctions would not end the regime, they might cause enough pain to cause Kim to give up its weapons. They point to the success of efforts to shut down illegal banking transactions and to the Proliferation Security Initiative, in which other countries agree to interdict transport of nuclear materials.
But success depends upon China, and South Korea and China failed to participate in recent PSI exercises. Moreover, in the wrangling over the UN resolution, China threatened a veto if there were any references to Chapter VII of the Charter, which allows enforcement. Knowing that China will not allow sanctions to cut too deeply, Kim is unlikely to give up his nuclear ace.
That leaves the third option, a diplomatic bargain, for which Kim’s price is direct talks with the US, a security guarantee, and the type of economic incentives that were offered to Iran. Bush has allowed his representative to the six-party talks to meet separately with the North Koreans within the six-party framework, but he failed to provide adequate incentives.
Given North Korea’s past deceptions, and the difficulty of verifying denuclearization in a totalitarian country, a verifiable agreement will be difficult to reach. But given the other options, the US would be wise to start thinking of a new diplomatic package.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2006.
www.project-syndicate.org
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Shouting from the rooftops
C’mon folks, the message from the US is loud and clear:
The tragedy is that we used to look up to the US as a beacon of light. What makes the people of the middle east and elsewhere so angry is this betrayal. Their foreign policy is stupid. They are trying nineteenth century tactics in a twenty first century world. World leaders with any guts have been trying to tell them this for years, but the US has been too full of itself to listen. Howard and Beazely understand the message. Other countries may be poor, but they are not stupid.
Does anyone actually disagree on this? If yes, then there is something to debate. Otherwise, let’s move on and look for solutions.
Mission thwarted
Craig Rowley: "Did senior Bush administration officials want North Korea to test a nuclear weapon because it would prove their point that the regime must be overthrown?"
Did senior North Korean officials opt out of multi-party negotiations with their neighbours about their nuclear weapons test in favour of one-on-one talks with the Bush administration in an attempt to "prove" that the regime was in danger of being "overthrown"?
Or was it a desparate attempt by a pitiably failed and degenerate regime at avoiding inevitable collapse under its own dead weight?
Mission accomplished
Did senior Bush administration officials want North Korea to test a nuclear weapon because it would prove their point that the regime must be overthrown?
The deal maker
Craig Rowley: "When George W. Bush stays the course of tough-talking 'diplomacy' on North Korea, combining harsh rhetoric and intimidating tactics, what is accomplished?"
No more or no less than the previous Clinton administration, if you are talking nuclear weapons. What seems to allude you is that Kim never stopped attempting to build nuclear weapons when Clinton was around. Bribes and all.
"When in his first weeks in office Bush cast aside the agreements negotiated by the Clinton administration what was accomplished?"
Firstly the US was no longer paying wasted bribe money. I mean say what you like about bribery but the idea is at least to get the desired result. Secondly it sent a message to every other second rate broke arse nation that grabbing yourself (or at least threatening to grab) a nuclear device come hell or highwater will not score you some big bucks.
"When in 2000 Bush rejected Kim Dae Jung's détente strategy for dealing with North Korea what was accomplished?"
Read my second point.
"When after the September 11 terror attacks Bush got tougher still and vowed to "rid the world of evil", listing North Korea as part of the "axis of evil", what did that accomplish?"
I don't know if it was meant to "accomplish" anything. He was simply stating a truth. Do you doubt it?
"When Bush sent to Congress a "nuclear posture review," which put North Korea on a list of potential targets for US nuclear weapons what was accomplished?"
Common sense. I would expect North Korea to be on that list. Any normal person would.
"When Bush denounced North Korea's leader Kim Jong Il as a "pygmy" and "a spoiled child at a dinner table" what did he accomplish?"
I don't think he was trying to accomplish anything. He was simply stating a truth. Do you doubt it?
"Bush's cowboy rhetoric and tough-talkin' diplomacy may play well with loudmouth TV pundits, newspaper columnists and radio hosts, but what else does it accomplish?"
A little more than bribes if the current situation is anything to go by. The fact is, the number one backer of North Korea has given up on them. The fact is, the number one backer (China) is more likely to attack North Korea than the US is. The fact is, China and the US have come closer because of this crisis.
The fact is North Korea are on notice that their nonsense will no longer be put up with. Now why would the US in a extreme postion of power throw all this away and give in to bribe demands? You must be kidding?
If you seriously believe what you are writing, I would keep you as far away from a negotiation table as humanly possible.
Anyhow later today I am off to the races to back myself a winner. If I score myself the triffecta and the US gives in to the Kim bribe demands, who wants to go halves in a nuclear bomb? Or at least a threatening letter to build one? Should be worth a good chunk of change.
the local mafia tough
When George W. Bush stays the course of tough-talking 'diplomacy' on North Korea, combining harsh rhetoric and intimidating tactics, what is accomplished?
When in his first weeks in office Bush cast aside the agreements negotiated by the Clinton administration what was accomplished?
When in 2000 Bush rejected Kim Dae Jung's détente strategy for dealing with North Korea what was accomplished?
When after the September 11 terror attacks Bush got tougher still and vowed to "rid the world of evil", listing North Korea as part of the "axis of evil", what did that accomplish?
When Bush sent to Congress a "nuclear posture review," which put North Korea on a list of potential targets for US nuclear weapons what was accomplished?
When Bush denounced North Korea's leader Kim Jong Il as a "pygmy" and "a spoiled child at a dinner table" what did he accomplish?
Bush's cowboy rhetoric and tough-talkin' diplomacy may play well with loudmouth TV pundits, newspaper columnists and radio hosts, but what else does it accomplish?
No point playing a game when the deck is loaded
With respect Craig Rowley there is no other workable solution to the North Korea problem. The bribe method has already been tried by the Clinton administration. It too failed.
The inter governmental bribe (which you are asking for) will not work for obvious reasons. As soon as the money runs out, Kim will be back at the table (with a nuclear device) looking for more. Similar to the local mafia tough leaning on the corner shop keeper.
The way to deal with this issue is to allow those with the most to lose, deal with it. In this case it is a nation such as China. The six party talks allow them and a few others their say.
This as I have said would seem an obvious course of action to any person with a medium of common sense.
Deal or no deal
Craig Rowley "To CP, the Bush administration was an example of wisdom all those months ago when they decided to stay on the path bringing about five failed rounds of the six-party talks and to not even start thinking of a carrot to offer in a deal to get the North Koreans to stop thinking they need to explode a nuclear bomb".
Of course they were right. This would be obvious to any person with even a medium of common sense.
The "carrot" of a deal offering (in the form of bribes) had already been tried on numerous occasions by the previous Clinton administration. North Korea are still attempting to gain a nuclear device, no?
The US is attempting not to go behind anyones back in making deals. This is the correct course of action. The North Korean apology and willingness to go back to talks proves this. The game is up and there are no more aces in the pack.
Offering "carrots" at this point in time would be akin to a large shopping conglomerate paying "go away money" to the local corner store. Clearly irrational and idiotic behaviour not suited to those that are in positions to make the big decisions.
A few cards short
"Of course they were right," says Jay. To stay the course that achieved five failed rounds of the six-party talks culminating in an a-bomb going off? Yeah, right.
Hardliners in Washington have made no secret of their distaste for real negotiations with North Korea. They see talks at the six-party table in the same terms as Jay does - a card game, winner takes all.
They made sure that the talks would not involve any negotiations. They had a course to stay. They were happy to pursue "talks without negotiations."
What did those in positions to make the big decisions actually achieve with that approach?
A way back to the non-negotiating table via a North Korean nuclear test?
Whose reality?
Wallerstein (a professor of sociology) provides an interesting alternative perspective on the issue.
CP's weird wisdom for this week
Notice the neat time warping C Parsons weaves into this week's weird attempt to steer off-topic yet another thread:
To CP, the Bush administration was an example of wisdom all those months ago when they decided to stay on the path bringing about five failed rounds of the six-party talks and to not even start thinking of a carrot to offer in a deal to get the North Koreans to stop thinking they need to explode a nuclear bomb.
They must have been so incredibly wise back then, according to CP's strange logic anyway, because today Bush and Condi are "absolutely right" for sticking to their guns, staying the course, and insisting on resumption of the six-party talks.
And the wisdom is so obvious in that ... in that ... um ... err ... sticking with that big-stick-don't-even-contemplate-carrot strategy has -- despite the slight diversion of the DPRK exploding a nuclear bomb -- achieved ... it's achieved ... well, it's ...um .. brought them all the way back to ... to ... well, all the way back to ... starting another round of six-party talks.
The wisdom of hindsight
"Given North Korea’s past deceptions, and the difficulty of verifying denuclearization in a totalitarian country, a verifiable agreement will be difficult to reach. But given the other options, the US would be wise to start thinking of a new diplomatic package."
In hindsight how wise it was for Professor Nye to suggest the US would be wise to start thinking of a new diplomatic package.
And how unwise it was for the Bush administration to fail to do that.